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 The Budget Process and the Size of the Budget
 John Ferejohn, Stanford University
 Keith Krehbiel, Stanford University
 The new congressional budget process provides- members of Congress with a new set
 of institutional mechanisms for making budget decisions. This article addresses the ques-
 tion of whether or under what conditions rigid application of the new budget process
 (modeled as, first, selection of the size of the budget and, second, its division) produces
 smaller budgets than a piecemeal appropriations process in which the size of the budget is
 determined residually. The theoretical result is that the new process sometimes results in
 relatively large budgets. A testable implication of the theory is that given a choice of how
 stringently the budget process is to be employed, members of Congress jointly consider
 preferences and the expected outcomes under available institutional arrangements and
 select the arrangement (usually a rule) that yields the most favorable outcome. Empirical
 results from the budget process in the House from 1980 to 1983 are generally supportive
 of the theoretically derived hypothesis of rational choice of institutional arrangements.
 In 1974 Congress adopted a new process for making budget deci-
 sions. Instead of considering appropriations requests one at a time and
 letting the overall level of spending be determined residually, the 1974
 Budget and Impoundment Control Act (PL 93-344) required Congress
 to enact a budget resolution that set overall spending levels and then
 instructed authorizations and appropriations committees to keep within
 those levels when writing their separate bills. A key purpose of the act
 was to encourage Congress to consider explicitly questions of fiscal pol-
 icy and to make trade-offs when setting spending levels for individual
 programs.
 Many of the proponents of the act believed that the budget process
 would lead to a lower level of spending than would otherwise occur.
 Their argument was that each member of Congress has programs in
 which he or she is especially interested and consequently attempts to
 expand through generous appropriations. But the sequential expansion
 of many programs ultimately leads to an overall level of spending that is
 higher than a majority would choose if the size of the budget were voted
 upon initially and directly. In other words, there was a widespread belief
 that everyone (or at least a majority of both houses) would prefer a lower
 budget level and correspondingly lower funding levels for individual
 programs than that which results from the piecemeal nature of pre-1974
 budgetary politics. This reasoning enticed fiscal conservatives to cru-
 sade for budgetary reforms. With the assistance of liberals, who were
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 increasingly disillusioned with President Nixon's aggressive use of im-
 poundments, reforms were passed almost unanimously.'
 While the major reason for the overwhelming support for the act is
 a matter of some dispute (Schick, 1980), there is no doubt that the de-
 bate surrounding its passage contains numerous references to its desir-
 ability as a tool to control budgetary growth (Fisher, 1985). But recent
 events, such as the dramatic increase in deficits and a persistent inability
 or unwillingness of either the Congress or the president to take corre-
 spondingly strong action, provide a basis for questioning the effective-
 ness of the 1974 budget reforms. There is no strong evidence for the
 proposition that the act has controlled spending. Rather, there is merely
 the argument that without the 1974 act, things would have been worse;
 levels of spending would have been higher and deficits larger.
 But determining whether the new budget process has achieved the
 goal of controlling expenditures, relative to an appropriate alternative
 such as the old appropriations process, is a difflcult task. As Shepsle
 (1984) notes, "the appropriate experiments cannot be run."2 Further-
 more, while we cannot experiment with Congress, Congress, neverthe-
 less, does annual experiments itself by choosing which of a variety of
 budgetary institutional arrangements to employ. These twin complexi-
 ties are addressed below by substituting a formal theory for the inability
 to experiment and, then, using the annual congressional choices of insti-
 tutional arrangements as sources of data suitable for testing the theory.
 Two models are developed and analyzed: a budget process and an appro-
 priations process. In the model of the budget process, which resembles
 post- 1974 decision making when the budget act is most rigidly applied,
 the first decision is on the size of the budget, and subsequent decisions
 are on levels of individual appropriations within the budget constraint.
 In the contrasting model of the appropriations process, which resembles
 pre-1974 budgeting or post-1974 weak applications of the budget act,
 appropriations decisions are made first, and the size of the budget is
 determined residually. The theory on which these models are based pro-
 vides an answer to the question of whether and when a budget process
 results in smaller budgets than an appropriations process. The endo-
 geneity of institutional features associated with congressional budgeting
 makes it possible to test the theory by interpreting roll call votes on
 procedural questions as revealed preferences for or against processes
 resembling one of the two stylized models.
 'The final votes in the House and Senate were 401-6 and 75-0.
 2Others are similarly cognizant of this difficulty (see, e.g., Schick, 1980; LeLoup,
 1980; Ellwood, 1983; Copeland, 1984; Shepsle, 1984; and Fisher, 1985).
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 A Theory of Congressional Budgeting
 We have only one history, of course, and in that history Congress
 passed the 1974 Budget and Impoundment Act. Although the new bud-
 get process was not immediately revolutionary, a new set of institutions
 and procedures emerged that can make congressional budgeting under
 the act significantly different from the old appropriations process. One
 such procedure is reconciliation.3 When included in the first budget res-
 olution and rigidly adhered to, reconciliation has the practical effect of
 making that resolution binding, thus constraining subsequent appropri-
 ations decision making. While perhaps not subscribed to universally,
 this view of reconciliation is increasingly orthodox.4 Ellwood (1984), for
 example, writes that
 by grouping a series of reductions into a single bill, [the reconciliation process] gives
 greater power to the aggregates (the "budget line"). The political debate can be shifted
 from the parts to the whole, particularly when the party leadership (at least in the
 House) obtains a limited or closed rule for the bill. (p. 377)
 Thus, not only reconciliation but also relatively closed amendment pro-
 cedures (as defined by special rules in the House) affect the degree to
 which the first-stage decision on the size of the budget is binding.
 Given a primary interest in the relative budget sizes that result from
 two different institutional arrangements but a concomitant inability to
 experiment with Congress, a convincing theory of budgeting is needed
 to predict budget sizes. Although the proposed versions of the old piece-
 meal appropriations process and the new budget process are stylized,
 they are nevertheless consistent with many descriptive accounts of old
 versus new forms of budgeting.5 Each is a special case of a general the-
 ory that is consistent with two intuitions about Congress. First, in each
 model, decision making occurs sequentially. The piecemeal appropria-
 tions process, which was prevalent before 1974, involved consideration
 of appropriations requests one at a time with the size of the budget de-
 termined ex post by summing the budget outlays granted in the separate
 3The strategic considerations surrounding the highly publicized reconciliation proce-
 dure of 1981 are described in Miller and Range (1983) and LeLoup (1982). For histories
 of reconciliation before and since 1981, see Fisher (1985), Gilmour (1985), Reischauer
 (1984), and Schick (1981).
 4Additional support can be found in Collender (1983) and Gilmour (1985). For a
 possible dissent-or at minimum a persuasive argument that the new budget process has
 loopholes in spite of reconciliation-see Fisher (1984, 1985).
 5See, e.g., Ellwood's (1983) "fragmented" and "comprehensive" approaches or Boze-
 man and Straussman's (1982) "bottom-up" versus "top-down" processes.
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 appropriations bills. In contrast, when the new budget process is rigidly
 applied, a binding first budget resolution sets the size of the budget ex
 ante. Then appropriations bills are considered sequentially as in the ap-
 propriations process, except that the budget constraint is known.
 A second feature of the general theory shared by the two specific
 models is that actors are sophisticated. Specifically, their votes at any
 given stage are influenced by others' preferences and by the consequences
 of the present choice on future choices. For example, in deciding on the
 first appropriations bill in a session, members do not ignore the fact that
 appropriating huge sums of money on current appropriations bills leaves
 less money for subsequent appropriations. Nor do they ignore what other
 members are likely to do, given their preferences and foresight.
 Ultimately., the theory enables prediction not only of individuals'
 behavior at given stages of the process but also of aggregate outcomes,
 that is, the size of the budget and the mix of appropriations to various
 programs. The theoretical finding contradicts the charges of disillu-
 sioned Democrats in 1981 as well as most conventional accounts of the
 effects of a stringently implemented budget process.6 In short, a strict
 budget process does not necessarily lead to smaller budgets than would
 have been produced by a process without a binding first resolution.
 Rather, the size of the budget depends on characterizable features of the
 preferences of legislators.
 The General Theory
 Assume that there are two dollar-denominated activities with which
 the legislature is concerned: military spending and domestic spending.
 Thus, any budgetary decision can be represented as a point in a two-
 dimensional space. Total public-sector spending is simply equal to mili-
 tary plus domestic spending. Any point in the space implicitly repre-
 sents a size of the budget in addition to a division of the budget between
 categories of expenditure. Legislators are assumed to have Euclidean
 preferences over the space of policy alternatives (i.e., circular indiffer-
 ence curves in the two-dimensional space). Thus, each member, i, has a
 most preferred point, xi For any two alternatives, y and z, a member
 prefers y to z if and only if the distance from x4 to y is less than the
 distance from xi to z. With this assumption about preferences, the mem-
 bers' preferences are completely described by their ideal points.
 A number of characteristics of this theory are well known. For
 example, unless extremely restrictive assumptions are made about the
 6An important exception is Ellwood (1984), to whose work we shall return in the
 discussion.
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 distribution of the ideal points, there is no pure majority rule equi-
 librium. However, if choice is restricted to a one-dimensional subset of
 the space, preferences on this subset are single-peaked, and there is a
 unique majority rule equilibrium on that subset. Two special cases of
 the general theory are illustrated below. Both exploit the foresight of
 actors which, in essence, constrains choice to a single dimension.
 Model A: The Appropriations Process
 Suppose that the legislature makes its allocative decision by break-
 ing the problem into pieces and sequentially deciding on the compo-
 nents. For example, the legislature may decide on the level of military
 expenditures first and then turn to the question of domestic spending,
 thus determining the total size of the budget. For any particular order of
 business, members' votes are determined by their anticipation of what
 happens at the subsequent stage(s), given what happens and happened at
 the current and prior stage(s).
 Consider the three-member legislature in Figure 1 and suppose that
 member 3 proposes to set military spending at ml, which is represented
 by the horizontal line through his ideal point. Members 1 and 2 examine
 the implications of a decision of ml at stage 1 for the subsequent deci-
 sion on the domestic dimension. They are repelled by their expectation
 that at the second and final stage the median of ideal points projected
 onto ml would be selected. In contrast, they see that a stage 1 decision
 of lower military expenditures would bring the outcome closer to their
 ideal points. Eventually, m2 (the median of ideal points projected onto
 the military dimension) is proposed and accepted at stage 1, whereupon
 the median of the ideal points projected onto m2 is selected at stage 2.
 With an odd number of legislators, this point is always the intersection
 of medians. Under an institutional arrangement that permits changes on
 only one dimension at a time, the point is an equilibrium,7 henceforth
 called the appropriations process equilibrium and labeled A.
 If each member has circular indifference curves, the appropriations
 process equilibrium does not depend on the order of voting on the ap-
 propriations bills. This model is a special case of a model considered by
 Kramer (1972), who provided sufflcient conditions for an equilibrium to
 be independent of the order of consideration of the bills. As Kramer
 observed, the equilibrium corresponds exactly to a sophisticated voting
 outcome.8
 7Notice that at the equilibrium (A) in Figure 1, any proposal in either a horizontal or
 vertical direction (but not both) fails to receive a majority of votes.
 8The existence of such equilibria may be proved under much more general circum-
 stances. If the members have strictly convex preferences, then, for any particular and
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 FIGURE 1
 Equilibrium in the Piecemeal Appropriations Process
 Military
 Spending
 m1~~~~~~~~~X
 X2
 Domestic
 Spending
 Model B: The Budget Process
 Suppose that instead of considering appropriations bills immedi-
 ately, members initially take up the question of the size of the budget,
 after which they decide on the allocation of resources for domestic and
 military purposes. Given a particular size of the budget (represented in
 two dimensions by a 45-degree line), the allocation question becomes
 one-dimensional and therefore has a unique majority rule equilibrium.
 This allows members to choose the size of the budget, conditioned
 commonly known ordering of bills for consideration, there will be an equilibrium. But
 since the location of the equilibrium depends on the order of consideration-something
 that might not be known by all members in advance-calculation of voting strategies by
 members is impeded. For that reason we focus on a model with circular preferences rather
 than one in which members know the order of consideration of appropriations bills. We
 return to this assumption in the final section.
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 by their expectations of what mix of military and domestic appropria-
 tions results from different budget sizes. This process is illustrated in
 Figure 2.
 The key to showing the existence and finding the location of the
 budget process equilibrium is that any given budget size has an associ-
 ated outcome. For example, if b, were the budget size selected at stage 1,
 then subsequent decision making yields the mix of domestic and mili-
 tary spending represented by 01, which is the median of ideal points
 projected onto the b1 budget line. For similar reasons, budget sizes b2
 and b3 have associated outcomes of 02 and 03, respectively. Since mem-
 bers of Congress are assumed to be sophisticated, they do not select a
 budget size without anticipating the consequences of that first choice on
 subsequent choices about how the budget is to be divided. Thus, b1 is
 FIGURE 2
 Equilibrium in the Budget Process
 Military
 Spending
 edian budget line
 Bugtsize
 associated outcomes
 Domestic
 Spending
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 not a first-stage choice because members 1 and 2 prefer outcomes asso-
 ciated with smaller budget sizes. Nor is b2 chosen because members 2
 and 3 prefer outcomes associated with larger budget sizes. Clearly, if
 there is an equilibrium under the specified conditions, the point must be
 in the set of budget size associated outcomes and must not be preferred
 by a majority to any other point in the set. In Figure 2 the set of budget
 associated outcomes is represented by the line perpendicular to the bud-
 get lines and passing through the ideal point of the median voter (mem-
 ber 3) with respect to the budget lines. A projection of ideal points onto
 the line of budget associated outcomes reveals legislator 2 as the median
 voter in this one-dimensional subspace. The point 03 therefore uniquely
 meets the specified conditions and is a budget process equilibrium, B.
 Existence of equilibria in both models permits answering the ques-
 tion of whether the size of the budget is always smaller under the budget
 process than under the appropriations process. Figure 3 shows that no
 general relationship exists. In Figure 3.A, conventional wisdom is con-
 firmed; total expenditures under the budget process (B) are exceeded by
 total expenditures under the appropriations process (A). However, when
 the configuration of ideal points is altered, as in Figure 3.B, the budget
 process produces the opposite outcome-larger expenditures than under
 the appropriations process.
 The analysis thus far establishes not only that institutional arrange-
 ments make a difference in budgeting outcomes but, more specifically, that
 the difference they make depends on the configuration of preferences of
 actors. The final theoretical task is to characterize configurations of prefer-
 ences that do and do not make the budget process an institutional arrange-
 ment that reduces the size of the budget. (We continue to focus on two
 dimensions of expenditure, even though the result can be generalized.)
 For convenience of exposition, assume that the legislature is large
 enough so that the distribution of members' ideal points can be de-
 scribed by a probability measure, j, that possesses a density function, f.
 Then the proportion of ideal points in a set of points, P, may be written
 (P) which equals fp f(x)dx. First, normalize expenditures so that the
 appropriations equilibrium (point A) is the origin. Now define the fol-
 lowing sets of points that partition the space as illustrated in Figure 4.
 P= {x: xi + x2 > O and xi s O}
 Q={x: xi +x20 and x2>0}
 R= {x: xi sO and x2sO}
 S= {x: xi +x2 O and xi >0)
 T= {x: x1 +x2 0 and x2 O}
 U={x:x1 X Oandx2 >}
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 FIGURE 3
 The Budget Process and the Size of the Budget
 A. Budget process results in a smaller budget.
 \ \ ~~~~~~X3
 Xi
 B
 B. Budget process results in a larger budget.
 B
 KEY:
 Budget lines
 Projections onto median budget line
 ........ .Projections of military and domestic medians onto point of intersection (A)
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 FIGURE 4
 Regions in the D x M Plane
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 Since the appropriations process equilibrium is the intersection of medi-
 ans and the budget process is the intersection of medians of ideal points
 that have been projected onto the axes rotated 45 degrees, the following
 proposition can be easily demonstrated.
 LEMMA: The budget process equilibrium, B, has a budget size
 larger than that of the appropriations equilibrium, A, if and only if
 j(P) + j(U) + ,(T)> 1/2.
 Necessary and. sufficient conditions for the budget process to increase
 the size of the budget follow.
 THEOREM: The budget size of the budget process equilibrium, B,
 exceeds the budget size of the appropriations equilibrium, A, if and
 only if j(P) > j(S) and j(T) > j(Q).
 PROoF: First note that because A is the intersection of medians,
 p$(P) + Is(Q) + j(R) = j(S) + j(T) + j(U)
 Is(Q) + .(P) + j(U) = .(R) + .(S) + IL(T),
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 and, by substitution, that opposite quadrants are equal:
 j(P) + j(Q) = p(S) + j(T), and
 ls(R) = g(U).
 For sufficiency, begin with the conditions and simply note that
 j(P) > j(S) and j(T) > p(Q)
 Is(P) + Is(T) > j(Q) + j(S) *
 Is(P) + Is(U) + Is(T) > 1/2 > Is(Q) + Is(R) + I(S),
 which, by the lemma, implies that the budget size under the budget pro-
 cess exceeds that of the appropriations process. For necessity, begin with
 an inequality implied by the lemma:
 Is(P) + I(U) + Is(T) > 1/2 > I(Q) + Is(R) + I(S)
 Is(P) + Is(T) > Is(Q) + Is(S).
 Now, using j(P) + j(Q) = j(S) + j(T), substitute
 .(S) + p(T) - p(Q) for j(P):
 j(S) + p(T) - j(Q) + p(T) > j(Q) + p(S)
 2g(T) > 2g(Q)
 j(T) > j(Q).
 A parallel argument yields p(P) > p(S) and establishes necessity. QED.
 Figure 4 helps illuminate the political substance that underlies the
 result. Theoretically, a heavy concentration of ideal points in regions
 P and T, relative to regions S and Q, respectively, means that the bud-
 get process has the somewhat counterintuitive effect of increasing the
 budget. The political translation, although somewhat cumbersome, is
 nonetheless meaningful. Notice first that members in P and T are dif-
 ferentiated from members in S and Q in terms of whether their desires
 for increases in expenditures in one area exceed their desires for de-
 creases in the other (relative to the origin after normalization). Accord-
 ingly, the theorem has the interpretation that implementation of a
 strict budget process results in a relatively large budget if and only if
 the number of strong-hawk/moderate-domestic-conservatives (P) ex-
 ceeds the number of moderate-domestic-liberal/strong-doves (S) and
 the number of strong-domestic-liberal/moderate-doves (T) exceeds the
 number of moderate-hawk/strong-domestic-conservatives (Q). In such
 circumstances an implicit agreement is made to increase the overall
 level of spending. Indeed, many explanations of the persistence of high
 deficits are consistent with this translation of the formal argument.
 Yet the theory is noncooperative. There is no assumption that a
 backroom bargain takes place that results in relatively high levels of
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 spending under the budget process. The rules of the chambers do not
 permit members to make binding commitments across votes, so explicit
 mutually beneficial transactions cannot be made. Indeed, the absence of
 a pure majority rule equilibrium implies that without the imposition of
 institutional structure, opportunities and incentives for some majority
 to improve its welfare would always exist. Therefore, whatever bargains
 occur must be implicit and must take place in such a fashion that it is in
 the interest of each party to execute his/her part of the agreement at the
 appropriate moment.
 A Test of the Theory
 An ideal test of the theory would consist of estimating each individ-
 ual's ideal point in a 16-dimensional space (one dimension for each of
 the functional categories in the budget resolution),9 calculating the bud-
 get process equilibrium as a 16-tuple of dollar values, observing the out-
 come of the budget process in the form of congressional appropriations,
 and finally assessing how close the predicted outcome is to the observed
 outcome. Obviously, this is not possible. A few of the many prohibitive
 obstacles deserve mention. First, the ideal test requires estimation tech-
 niques that have not been developed, namely, the identification of ideal
 points for each member, stated in dollar values. Second, the functional
 categories of the budget resolution do not correspond precisely with the
 subsequent appropriations bills. Moreover, Congress typically fails to
 pass at least a few such bills. And third, since Congress does not repeat
 the budget processes in a given year under different institutional ar-
 rangements, at most one model per year can be tested directly, and even
 then there are no straightforward criteria for determining what a good
 or close prediction is.
 In spite of these difflculties, the theory is not to be dismissed as
 untestable. Rather, an indirect test is devised that, at minimum, provides
 an opportunity to reject the theory. The test exploits the fact that, in four
 consecutive years beginning in 1980, the House made an observable
 choice about the form of its budget process to implement. While the
 House's menu of institutional arrangements does not include our pure
 forms of budgeting, the arrangements, nevertheless, approximate one
 model or the other. For the annual budget cycles in the House from 1980
 to 1983, two related questions are addressed by focusing on the House's
 choice of procedures. First, how binding is the budget line set by the first
 resolution? Second, how easy is it for members to make piecemeal adjust-
 ments in appropriations amounts? In general, to the degree that the rules
 9The number of functional categories has varied over the years (see Fisher, 1985, p. 20).
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 for amendments or other institutional features employed strengthen the
 first resolution and restrict members' opportunities to adjust appropria-
 tions amounts, the process approximates the model of the pure budget
 process. Conversely, nonbinding first resolutions and/or provisions for
 modifying appropriations are indicative of a process more akin to piece-
 meal appropriations. The most straightforward example is 1981, in which
 the key procedural vote was explicitly about consideration of the Gramm-
 Latta reconciliation bill under either an open or a closed rule. The closed
 procedure was adopted, and the reconciliation instructions previously in-
 corporated into the budget resolution proved to be genuinely constrain-
 ing, thus approximating model B. Though sometimes less explicit, com-
 parable choices also occurred in other years of the study. The Appendix
 contains a detailed description of the votes.
 The test, therefore, is an analysis of procedural votes. It consists of
 three steps: estimation of ideal points in a two-dimensional space, com-
 putation of the equilibrium outcomes under the two pure models, and
 assessment of the degree to which votes on procedures are consistent
 with various hypotheses. The votes predicted by the theory require that
 members behave as if they know and believe the theory. Individual
 members of Congress know the consequences of the real-world ana-
 logues to the pure appropriations and budget processes, and, given their
 expectations about the outcomes that would result, their choice of pro-
 cedures is rational. If a member's ideal point is closer to A than to B, the
 member opposes the procedure that has the effect of making the budget
 resolution binding, preferring instead to have the opportunity to make
 piecemeal changes (via amendments) in appropriations and thus implic-
 itly in the overall budget ceiling. If votes are consistent with this hypoth-
 esis of rational choice of institutional arrangements, the model will be
 supported. In contrast, if competing hypotheses predict as well or better
 throughout the period, then the theory will be rejected.
 As depicted in the theory, the three substantive ingredients repre-
 sented by ideal points are preferences on domestic policy, defense pol-
 icy, and overall government spending. A relatively simple scaling tech-
 nique based on three corresponding interest group ratings is employed
 here.'0 First, define a vector x = (xl, x2) in which the first component is
 the member's League of Women Voters score (based primarily on do-
 mestic roll call votes), and the second component is the member's Na-
 tional Security Index (reflecting the degree of prodefense voting as
 '?There is an expanding literature on (and controversies surrounding) measurement
 of preferences (see, e.g., Carson and Oppenheimer, 1984; Kalt and Zupan, 1984; Kau and
 Rubin, 1979; and Poole, 1981).
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 evaluated by the American Security Council). This vector is then
 scaled as a function of overall antispending roll call voting behavior, as
 measured by the National Taxpayer's Union score. The formula for the
 ideal point is:
 x = [1 - (NTU/200)]x.
 All scores range from zero to 100; thus, for example, the most fiscally
 conservative members (NTU = 100) are scaled back halfway toward the
 origin, while NTU's "biggest spenders" who score 0 maintain their origi-
 nal values of xi and x2.
 Given the estimated ideal points, identification of equilibria for the
 appropriations and budget processes is straightforward. The appropria-
 tions process equilibrium (A) is the intersection of medians on the do-
 mestic and military dimensions; the budget process equilibrium (B) is
 the intersection of medians of projected ideal points onto the axes ro-
 tated 45 degrees.
 The primary interest is in the relative predictive power of flve hy-
 potheses. Three of these formally embody individual-level rational choice;
 the remaining two are representative of conventional and relatively infor-
 mal accounts of congressional budgeting since 1974. The hypotheses are:
 HYPOTHESIS 1: Rational choice of institutional arrangements. Mem-
 bers consider both the size of the budget and how it is divided. Pre-
 dictions are determined by the relative distances between a member's
 ideal point and the institution-associated equilibria, A and B, as de-
 termined by H1 (see Figure 5).
 HYPOTHESIS 2: Rational choice of budget size (fiscal liberalism-
 conservatism). Members choose the institutional arrangement ac-
 cording to their preferences on size of the budget (without regard
 to its division). Predictions are determined by H2, a 45-degree
 northwest-to-southeast line passing through point C (which is
 equidistant from A and B).
 HYPOTHESIS 3: Rational choice of budget division (guns-versus-butter
 liberalism-conservatism). Members choose the institutional arrange-
 ment according to their preferences on division of the budget, namely
 high domestic and low military spending versus high military and low
 domestic spending. Budget size, however, is not taken into account.
 Line H3, a 45-degree southwest-to-northeast line passing through C,
 partitions the set of ideal points to determine this prediction.
 HYPOTHESIS 4: Conventional wisdom: Party. Republicans (assumed
 to be more fiscally conservative than Democrats) vote for the strict
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 FIGURE 5
 Separating Hyperplanes for Hypotheses 1-3
 x2: Military
 Spending
 \\A_ B
 A
 H3 HI
 xi: Domestic
 Spending
 form of the budget process, which they believe results in a smaller
 budget; Democrats do the opposite.
 HYPOTHESIS 5: Conventional wisdom: Party and region. Republi-
 cans and Southern Democrats (assumed to be more fiscally conser-
 vative than non-Southern Democrats) vote for the strict form of the
 budget process. Non-Southern Democrats vote for the weaker form
 which resembles piecemeal appropriations.
 Hypotheses 2 and 3 are included as null models, albeit models with
 some theoretical and spatial foundation. One main empirical question
 is whether Hypothesis 1, which jointly considers questions of budget
 size and budget division, predicts better than the models in which only
 size or division is considered. Hypotheses 2 and 3, then, can be viewed
 as constrained versions of our theory. In contrast, Hypotheses 4 and 5
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 have no explicit spatial or theoretical basis, but have been proffered by
 observers of recent cycles of congressional budgeting. The relevant com-
 parison here is not Hypothesis 4 with 5, but rather Hypotheses 4 and 5
 with 1. The latter comparisons answer the question of whether an ex-
 plicit theoretical account of how preferences are expressed in a rich
 institutional context facilitates prediction of congressional behavior and
 budgetary outcomes.
 Results
 Table 1 presents the percentage of votes correctly predicted by
 each hypothesis in 1980-83. Overall, Hypothesis 1-rational choice of
 institutional arrangements-predicts best. Next in overall performance
 are Hypotheses 3 and 2, the restricted versions of our theory. Finally,
 the hypotheses based on regularities in party voting and in party-region
 coalition formation have the worst overall records, dropping below 50
 percent for the four-year period. The bottom line, then, supports the
 generalization that the more information a theory explicitly incorpo-
 rates about individual preferences, the better it predicts endogenous in-
 stitutional choices.
 Inasmuch as the bottom line fails to convey the whole story, it is use-
 ful to look more closely at individual years, as summarized in Figure 6.
 Consider the year in which the conventional wisdom hypotheses perform
 best and on which (understandably) much of conventional wisdom is
 TABLE 1
 Percentage of Votes Correctly Predicted by the Five Hypotheses
 Coordinates of Equilibria Hypotheses*
 Year N Appropriations Budget 1 2 3 4 5
 1980 421 (39.0,42.8) (39.7,42.2) 76.5 62.7 76.7 3.8 20.1
 1981 427 (42.4,54.0) (33.9, 53.2) 86.7 65.1 78.2 93.0 85.3
 1982 417 (43.5, 54.5) (34.9, 54.5) 69.3 64.3 63.6 77.0 70.5
 1983 426 (52.8, 39.2) (44.2, 34.3) 17.8 34.0 13.1 7.0 18.7
 Average 62.6 56.9 57.9 45.2 48.7
 Rank 1 3 2 5 4
 * 1: Rational choice of institutional arrangements.
 2: Rational choice of budget size.
 3: Rational choice of budget division.
 4: Conventional wisdom: Party.
 5: Conventional wisdom: Party-region.
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 based: 1981. Unified Republicans coalesced with fiscally conservative
 Southern Democrats (Boll Weevils) to adopt the most dramatic reconcili-
 ation package in the four-year period. Accordingly, Hypotheses 4 and 5
 correctly predict a high percentage of the votes-93.0 and 85.3, respec-
 tively. But inspection of the distribution of preferences in 1981 illustrates
 three less-obvious points. First, consistent with conventional wisdom,
 ideal points were such that the budget process resulted in a relatively
 small budget in 1981. Second, the data and theory suggest that the bulk of
 the reductions in expenditures should have occurred on the domestic di-
 mension, which indeed they did. And third, although overshadowed by
 the performance of the party-based conventional wisdom hypothesis, Hy-
 pothesis 1, nevertheless, scores an impressive 86.7 percent. Thus, the
 events of 1981, from which much conventional wisdom is derived, appear
 to have a theoretical basis.
 The situation is similar in 1982. The distribution of ideal points is
 comparable in 1981 and 1982, as one would expect in the absence of an
 intervening election. Accordingly, the budget process equilibrium (B)
 again produces a smaller budget than that for the appropriations process
 (A). Notice, however, that the relative reduction comes at the expense of
 domestic spending; point B is actually slightly greater on the military
 dimension. While we are reluctant to make too much of this difference,
 it, nevertheless, seems consistent with the final outcome of the 1982
 budget process. Defense spending continued to increase significantly in
 spite of further cuts in domestic spending." Finally, as in 1981 each
 hypothesis predicts reasonably well, although not as well as in the previ-
 ous year.
 The combined analyses for 1981 and 1982 underscore the diffi-
 culties with selecting one hypothesis over another when they yield simi-
 lar predictions. Such will be the case whenever Republicans are predom-
 inantly fiscally conservative, Democrats tend to be bigger spenders, and
 the condition of the theorem is not met. Thus, for a more convincing
 demonstration that theory is an improvement upon conventional wis-
 dom, it would be useful to observe a year in which the configuration of
 preferences meets the condition stated in the theorem. Such a year is
 1980, although just barely. Here strict application of the budget process
 has the theoretical effect opposite that in 1982: to increase domestic
 spending, decrease defense spending, and increase (slightly) the size of
 the budget. Consequently, in 1980, Hypotheses 4 and 5 predict very
 poorly (3.8 and 20.1 percent, respectively). Democrats overwhelmingly
 favored a strict budget process in 1980 while Republicans opposed it.
 " See Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1982, p. 195).
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 FIGURE 6
 Distribution of Ideal Points and Normalized Locations
 of Equilibria, 1980-83*
 1980 1981
 59 48
 42 67
 115 102
 A A
 B * ~~~~~~B 39
 116
 42 66
 57 110
 B =(0.8, -.07) B - (-8.5, -0.8)
 1982 1983
 45 34
 62 32
 110
 151
 B A A
 4 ~~~~~~~~~60
 6 1 * B 31
 111 ~~~~~~~~~124
 B -(-8.6, 0.02) B - (-8.6, -4.9)
 *The piecemeal appropriations equilibrium (A) is always at the origin (0, 0). Numbers denote
 members whose ideal points were located in the given region.
 Moreover, since the supporting Democrats tended to have ideal points
 in the prodomestic-antimilitary regions of the space, Hypotheses 1 and 3
 predict well (76.5 and 76.7 percent, respectively). Still, given the close-
 ness of the two equilibria- in 1980 and the crudeness of our estimated
 ideal points, this support is qualified.
 At this stage in the analysis, 1983 was expected to be a uniquely
 useful if not decisive year for the test. Interpretations of the 1982 elec-
 tion and of the subsequent 1983 budget process suggest that the configu-
 ration of preferences in 1983 would more closely approximate that of
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 1980 than 1981 and 1982. Democrats gained 26 seats in the 1982 elec-
 tion by running against Reagan's domestic spending cuts. Republicans,
 meanwhile, stressed differences between their preferences and Reagan's
 policies and recession. Moreover, these apparent trends toward restora-
 tion of spending persisted into the budget cycle. The House's budget
 resolution, which called for a $33 billion increase in domestic spending
 was dubbed the "Democratic Manifesto," and House Republicans went
 to extremes not to consider Reagan's budget, which called for further
 reductions in domestic spending. The Republican strategy was to seek a
 rule that would have permitted consideration of as many as 15 amend-
 ments, a la the piecemeal appropriations process. But the Democrats
 won the procedural battle in 1983, passing a modified closed rule. In
 practice, the rule was completely closed, since Republicans, not wanting
 to embarrass Reagan, declined to put forth a substitute.
 The administration was similarly unenthusiastic about its prospects
 for a repeat performance of the budget process. The Congressional Quar-
 terly Almanac called it an "ironic turnabout" that
 the Reagan administration displayed growing disenchantment with the process which
 the president had used as a vehicle for implementing his economic program in 1981 and
 1982. As lawmakers whittled away at Reagan's proposed military spending increase,
 Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger suggested to the president that the adminis-
 tration might be better off without a congressional budget. That way, Weinberger rea-
 soned, Reagan might be able to get more money for defense in the appropriations pro-
 cess, and he would be able to veto funding bills for other programs if he thought they
 were too high. (1983, p. 435)12
 How might these perceptions and events be summarized in terms of
 the theory? Electoral outcomes suggest redistribution of ideal points from
 S to T (and perhaps from Q to P) in the policy space, while Weinberger's
 strategy suggests that the appropriations process would have resulted in
 greater defense spending than would the budget process. Thus, the budget
 process equilibrium could be expected to be located east-southeast of the
 appropriations equilibrium-south if Weinberger's expectation of lower
 defense spending under the budget process were correct, and east if the
 strength of the Democrats were, in fact, based on a desire for restoration
 of domestic programs. The corresponding prediction of the theory is that
 such Democrats would succeed in using the budget process to bring about
 a relative increase in the size of the budget. However, as Figure 6 shows,
 not all of these changes are reflected in the data. The budget process
 indeed seems to have kept military expenditures relatively low (as
 12See also Reischauer (1984, p. 409) and Fisher (1984, p. 417).
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 Weinberger feared), and Democrats definitely supported protection of
 their resolution by passing the restrictive rule (see Table 1, Hypothesis 4).
 But because the expected easterly shift of B relative to A did not occur, all
 five hypotheses predict poorly in 1983.
 The results from 1983 raise the awkward question of whether the
 theory or the data are suspect. While ultimately the reader should make
 this judgment, presently we cannot deny that our prediction is poor in
 1983. We can merely point to assorted electoral facts, legislative strate-
 gies, and administrative statements that seem more consistent with the
 theory than with the data. In contrast, it is not possible to explain away
 the failure of the conventional wisdom hypotheses in 1983 (nor in 1980).
 Indisputably, Republicans sometimes oppose strict application of the
 new budget process.
 In sum, the empirical analysis yields one confident and two tentative
 findings. The confident finding is the considerable direct evidence against
 hypotheses based on conventional notions of party and region. The tenta-
 tive findings include some direct evidence for the hypothesis of rational
 choice of institutional arrangements and thus some indirect evidence for
 our institution- and preference-based theory of congressional budgeting.
 Discussion
 The theory of congressional budgeting was developed and tested in
 the context of a simple two-dimensional policy space and under some
 rather strong assumptions. The choice of simplicity over complexity was
 dictated by a strong desire to test the theory, even if only indirectly. This
 discussion notes some possible theoretical modifications and places the
 results in the context of prior studies of the budget process.
 The two assumptions that are perhaps most objectionable are circu-
 lar preferences and the number of issues. The number of issues under
 consideration is not essential to the formal argument. Attention was re-
 stricted to two issues-domestic and military spending-only to facili-
 tate exposition, to maintain a resemblance between the theory and actual
 congressional budgetary politics, and to perform a test. In principle (if
 not in practice), the theoretical results can be extended and applied to a
 world with, say, 13 appropriations bills, in which case the appropriations
 and budget process equilibria still could be derived. Similarly, the distri-
 butional conditions for the budget process resulting in a larger budget
 could be determined. But the calculations would be more complicated,
 and the conditions for different budget sizes under different institutional
 arrangements would be difficult to interpret. Furthermore, the argument
 that members possess sufficient information about preferences to behave
 in a fully sophisticated manner may be more difficult to sustain.
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 A second possible theoretical modification is to relax the assump-
 tion on preferences from circularity to strict convexity. Then it would
 remain true that every one-dimensional subset of the space has a unique
 majority rule equilibrium; however, the location of the new equilibrium
 would depend on the order in which appropriations bills arise. This
 raises two problems. First, because there would be several different
 order-dependent equilibria for each process, it would be difflcult to as-
 sess the effect of changing from one institution to another. Second, if
 members did not know the order in which the appropriations bills were
 to be decided, their calculations of voting strategies would not be
 straightforward. In essence, equilibria would still exist, but in the ab-
 sence of imposing some additional structure on the problem (such as a
 specified order of voting on appropriations), it seems unlikely that mem-
 bers of Congress would behave such that the equilibria were obtained.
 There are two ways of addressing this situation, although neither is
 completely satisfactory. It could be assumed that members know the
 order in which bills are considered and that the order is the same with or
 without the new budget process. But historically the ordering of con-
 gressional appropriations bills is erratic. An alternative assumption is
 that members believe that each order was equally probable and that at
 each stage they calculated the consequences of their decisions accord-
 ingly. The consequences of this modification are unclear.
 In light of these difficulties, and for the reasons specified in foot-
 note 8, the assumption of circular indifference curves was employed
 rather than a known order of voting. Under these conditions the order of
 consideration of bills is not essential to the principal theoretical result.
 The equilibrium under the budget process is positive with respect to the
 appropriations equilibrium if and only if a majority prefers to move in a
 budget-increasing direction (or, technically, that a majority of members
 have gradients in P, U, or T, as illustrated in Figure 4).
 While not overwhelming, the empirical support for the theory is
 reasonably strong, given that the theory is motivated by individuals'
 preferences and that good measures of such preferences are difflcult to
 devise. Naturally, advocates of various emerging techniques (see fn. 10)
 are invited to reassess these results using the method of their choice. As
 noted earlier, our choice was shaped by a desire for simplicity.
 With these qualifications and insofar as the failure of the conven-
 tional wisdom hypotheses is convincing, the contrasting inability to re-
 ject the hypothesis derived from this new theory of the budget process
 must be interpreted as supportive. We hasten to add, however, that by
 rejecting party- and region-based accounts of voting, we are not main-
 taining that party and region are unimportant in congressional budgeting.
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 To the contrary, major roll call votes on the floor during the budget pro-
 cess are almost invariably partisan, and significant deviations from parti-
 san votes are often associated with region, especially in the 1980s and in
 the House. Nevertheless, the temptation to respond to these empirical reg-
 ularities by embracing party and region as explanations for congressional
 behavior should be avoided because, in the absence of additional informa-
 tion, the associated predictions are vacuous. In the case of choosing bud-
 getary institutional arrangements, for example, a prediction that a mem-
 ber votes with his/her party (or region) says nothing explicit about why
 he/she does so, nor does it say how other members of his/her party (or
 region) vote. The key points are that the party and region variables are
 proxies for preferences and that such preferences-when combined with
 members' expectations about how institutions work-are the real predic-
 tors of congressional behavior in the budget process.
 Not all of these ideas are new. Students of electoral behavior are
 undoubtedly familiar with the argument that the party variable is a
 proxy for preferences (Page and Jones, 1979; Fiorina, 1981; Rivers,
 1981), and more recently the same observation has been transported to
 congressional budgeting (West, 1985). Similarly, the combined effects of
 preferences and institutions are prevalent in two bodies of the congres-
 sional literature. Most obvious of these are theoretical studies that iden-
 tify "structure-induced equilibria" (Shepsle, 1979, 1986; Shepsle and
 Weingast, forthcoming; Denzau and Mackay, 1983; Krehbiel, forth-
 coming). Empirical studies are also implicitly consistent with the com-
 bined focus on preferences and institutions. For example, historical
 studies of how congressional electoral outcomes are translated into pol-
 icy outcomes identify changes in members' preferences and occasional
 calculated changes in internal institutional features as key causes
 (Brady, 1985; Brady and Morgan, 1986; Stewart, 1985). And more re-
 cent topics include how electoral incentives of members of Congress
 affect budget outcomes, and how the presidential veto and budgetary
 reversion points help predict appropriations outcomes (Kiewiet and
 McCubbins, 1985, 1986).
 While consistent with several prior studies, this research uniquely in-
 troduces a testable individual-level theory of the congressional budget pro-
 cess. To the question of whether a strict budget process reduces the size of
 the budget relative to a piecemeal appropriations process, the theoretical
 answer of "not necessarily" is ostensibly equivocal. But fortunately the
 theory specifies the precise conditions and has testable implications. If the
 data are convincing, then the answer to the parallel empirical question-
 whether the budget process in practice has reduced the size of the budget
 relative to alternative arrangements-is almost surely "yes" for the early
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 1980s.13 Critics of the new congressional budget process may doubt that
 things would have been "worse" in its absence, but our primary focus and
 findings are somewhat broader. We are persuaded by and more generally
 have corroborated Ellwood's (1984) argument that the effect of reconcilia-
 tion on budget sizes is "neutral on its face." So too is the new budget
 process. But additionally, this study demonstrates why the institutional
 story is not the whole story, neither in theory nor in practice. In practice,
 individual preferences temper the theoretical neutrality of institutions.
 Thus, the thesis that preferences and institutions "conspire" to produce
 structure-induced equilibria (Shepsle, 1979) takes on a more concrete
 meaning in the context of congressional budgeting. The coconspirators in
 congressional budgetary outcomes are preferences of individual members
 regarding spending and their ability to choose institutional arrangements.
 Manuscript submitted 10 September 1985
 Final manuscript received 16 May 1986
 APPENDIX
 Votes
 In 1980 the key vote (no. 456) was on the rule that would govern debate on the
 reconciliation bill, HR 7765. The modified closed rule, H.Res. 776, would have permitted
 only "technical amendments" (Congressional QuarterlyAlmanac, 1980, p. 128). The deci-
 sive vote came on Rules Committee Chairman Richard Bolling's motion for the previous
 question which in effect blocked amendments on the rule (and in turn blocked all contro-
 versial amendments from the bill). A yea vote, therefore, is interpreted as supportive of a
 strict budget process. Conversely, a nay vote would have resulted in attempts to amend the
 rule, namely by allowing for greater amendments on the bill to which it pertained. Ulti-
 mately, a more open rule would have resulted in decision making that approximated an
 appropriations process. But the relatively closed procedure was adopted in a 250-157
 vote. (Alternatively, the earlier vote on an~ amendment to remove the reconciliation in-
 structions from the first resolution could have been used. The later vote on the rule for the
 reconciliation bill was selected because ultimately the restrictive rule was necessary for
 the 1980 process to approximate our model of the budget process.)
 In preparation for debate on the 1981 reconciliation bill, Democrats wrote a rule for
 floor debate under which members would vote separately on spending cuts included in the
 bill (and supported by the administration). Had it passed, the binding effect of the first
 budget resolution would have been undermined, whereas under the procedure favored by
 the Republicans and conservative Democrats a single up-or-down vote was taken on the
 Gramm-Latta package. Vote number 95 was the main procedural vote (Congressional
 Quarterly Almanac, 1981, p. 262). The motion was rejected 210-217.
 There was no comparable controversy over rules in 1982, although there was a dis-
 pute during consideration of the first budget resolution that determined how rigidly the
 expenditure levels would be enforced. To each of three substitutes to the resolution,
 3 Of the possible exceptions, 1983 is questionable, and 1980 appears to have been a year
 in which the budget-increasing effect of a relatively strict budget process was minimal.
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 Appropriations Committee Chairman Jamie Whitten proposed amendments that called
 for the removal of deferred enrollment. Deferred enrollment is a provision that requires
 any appropriation that exceeds the budget ceiling (established by the resolution) to be kept
 from going to the president (see Fisher, 1985, pp. 9-10). Whitten's proposed removal of
 the provision, therefore, would have made it possible for appropriations to exceed the
 ceiling established by the resolution, which of course is contrary to a budget process in
 which the resolution is genuinely binding. Roll call votes were taken on only two of his
 three amendments, and the analysis reported is of the first vote (no. 119). A vote against
 the amendment is interpreted as support for the budget process (Congressional Quarterly
 Almanac, 1982, pp. 194-95). The amendment was adopted 212-205.
 The main procedural vote in 1983 was on the Democratic rule to the first budget
 resolution (no. 38). The rule permitted only one Republican substitute to the Budget
 Committee's resolution which otherwise was protected from amendments. A vote in favor
 of the modified closed rule is interpreted as support for the budget process, since the
 resolution contained reconciliation instructions and provisions for making the spending
 ceilings of the first resolution binding if a second resolution were not passed. The vote was
 230 for and 187 against (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1983, p. 437).
 (For all roll calls, pairs and announcements were coded as if they were votes.)
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